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Abstract: This paper examines what happens to mortgages in the subprime 
mortgage market once foreclosure proceeding are initiated. A multinomial 
logit model that allows for the interdependence of the possible outcomes or 
risks (cure, partial cure, paid off, and real estate owned) through the 
correlation of associated unobserved heterogeneities is estimated. The results 
show that the duration of foreclosures is impacted by many factors including 
contemporaneous housing market conditions, the prior performance of the 
loan (prior delinquency), and the state-level legal environment. 
Introduction 
Although a borrower is technically in default when a single 
payment is missed or late, lenders usually wait a substantial period of 
time, typically more than 90 days, before attempting to take 
possession of the property.1 Lenders can take possession of property 
through foreclosure proceedings or through less adversarial 
approaches, such as deeds in lieu of foreclosure. For the vast majority 
of loans, the taking of property is not profitable for the lender. As a 
result, lenders make substantial efforts to delay or even forgo 
foreclosure and find alternative and less costly outcomes (Capozza and 
Thomson 2006). In addition, even after foreclosure proceedings have 
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started, lenders and borrowers can work to find alternative outcomes 
which may impose a lower cost on either party. 
However, a substantial fraction of subprime loans do enter 
foreclosure proceedings. For example, the Mortgage Bankers 
Association of America reports that over 9% of outstanding subprime 
loans were in foreclosure at some point during the 2000–2001 time 
period. In contrast, over the same time period, well under 1% of prime 
loans are in foreclosure. It is the time period when loans are in 
foreclosure that this paper focuses on. In particular the paper asks the 
question: What happens to subprime loans once foreclosure has been 
initiated by the lender? In particular, what is the probability that a loan 
in foreclosure today will eventually be in a state of cure (an active 
loans that is current or delinquent), prepaid, or will the lender become 
the owner of the property? The empirical investigation should help 
lenders make better decisions when processing loans in foreclosure 
and provide policy makers with clear avenues for improving the 
foreclosure process for everyone involved. 
In general, of those loans that exit foreclosure and terminate 
the loan, almost 60% end up with the collateral property owned by the 
lender and 40% are paid off. Approximately 13% exit foreclosure but 
do not terminate and are either cured or partially (active, but 
delinquent) cured. The empirical approach uses a competing-risk 
discrete-mass-point mixed multinomial logit model specification. The 
results indicate that while many factors can impact the outcome of a 
loan in foreclosure, the policy makers and the resulting legal 
environment tend to dominate other factors. In particular, loans in 
states that require that the judicial system control the foreclosure 
proceedings tend to linger in foreclosure, while loans in states where 
foreclosure proceedings are completed under the power-of-sale tend to 
exit foreclosure much earlier through all available options (cure, 
collateral owned by the lender, or paid off). 
This analysis provides a contribution to the literature in a 
number of ways. First, the length of foreclosure is examined in detail 
in the subprime market. Second, the type of exit is identified in a 
detailed loan-level data set of monthly observations of loans in 
foreclosure. Third, since most if not all the mortgage performance data 
sets have little information about the borrower, (for example, 
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contemporaneous borrower employment, health status, or non-
housing wealth) the use of multinomial logit in the foreclosure 
literature is advanced by allowing for the interdependence of the 
potential exits (hazards or risks) from foreclosure through the 
correlation of associated, unobserved heterogeneities. 
Motivation and Literature 
One of the most widely studied topics in the mortgage finance 
literature is the termination of loans through borrower default. 
Typically default is treated as the time period when the foreclosure 
process is finished and the property has been sold.2 However, lenders 
attempt to recover any losses in a multiphase process once the 
borrower has stopped making payments. In particular, there is 
evidence that subprime loans tend to linger in delinquency for long 
periods before curing or terminating the loan. Capozza and Thomson 
(2006) find that subprime loans that are 90 days or more delinquent 
take four times longer to become Real Estate Owned (REO), but are 
much less likely to cure. In addition, Danis and Pennington-Cross 
(2005) find that subprime loans that linger in delinquency are much 
more likely to be prepaid than enter foreclosure proceedings. They 
interpret this type of prepayment as “distressed” prepayment because 
of the large payment that would be necessary to bring the status of 
the loan back to current (cured). Not surprisingly, given their extended 
period of serious delinquency, subprime loans tend to inflict larger 
losses than prime loans (Capozza and Thomson 2005). 
Other studies have focused on the outcome of loans that are 
90 days delinquent. For example, Ambrose and Capone (1998) follow 
more than 30,000 Federal Housing Authority (FHA)-insured loans until 
final resolution (reinstatement, property sale, assignment to the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, and foreclosure). 
Loans are separated depending on the amount of equity in the home. 
Negative equity defaulters are viewed as “ruthless” because the value 
of the home is smaller that the value of the outstanding mortgage. As 
a result, it may make financial sense to default. Defaulters with 
positive equity are viewed as likely being “trigger event” defaulters. 
Trigger events are typically thought of as unexpected events that 
make it difficult for a household to continue making timely payments 
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to service their current debt obligations. This includes job loss, a 
significant change in health status, and changes in family structure 
(divorce, in particular). If a household has used subprime lending, it is 
very unlikely that the household will have substantial resources to 
soften the impact of any trigger events. In fact, historically, the most 
popular product in subprime is the cash-out refinance, which is 
typically used to pay off other outstanding debt. Therefore, in 
subprime loans that are in default, they likely include many trigger 
event defaults and not ruthless defaults. 
If foreclosure is an event that both borrowers and lenders would 
prefer to avoid, then conditions that make alternatives less costly, and 
hence more attractive, should be associated with lower REO rates and 
more lender forbearance. Various studies have found that 
contemporaneous economic conditions such as interest rates and 
house price appreciation can have substantial impacts on the 
disposition of a seriously delinquent loan (Ambrose and Capone 1998; 
Ambrose et al. 1997; Phillips and Vanderhoff 2004; Capozza Thomson 
2005, 2006; Lambrecht et al. 2003; Phillips and Rosenblatt 1997). For 
example, if there is positive equity in a home, then the borrower can 
sell the house, pay off the debt, and avoid foreclosure. While the 
borrower may prefer to be a homeowner and not move, it may be less 
costly to move and sell the home than to be evicted. If interest rates 
have declined, it may also be possible for the borrower to refinance 
the loan and have more manageable monthly payments.3  
Data 
The data consist of 5,000 loans that were originated over the 
calendar years 2001–2005. The time period of each loan’s life under 
examination is the first month that the loan is reported as being in 
foreclosure until the loan terminates or December 2005 (whichever is 
first); 82% of the loans are observed to exit foreclosure over the 
observed time period. Of the exited loans, 50% became lender REO 
property. While examining subprime loans over an 8 month time 
period, Capozza and Thomson (2005) found that 79% of defaulted 
loans (90 days or more delinquent) became REO property and the 
remaining 21% cured or prepaid. The 50% REO rate found in this 
study is likely to differ from the 79% REO rate because of different 
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data sources (one lender versus a variety of lenders), different starting 
points (90 days delinquent versus in foreclosure), and different 
economic conditions. In addition, Phillips and Vanderhoff (2004) find 
that 30% of defaulted conventional fixed rate loans and 50% of 
defaulted conventional adjustable rate loans transition to REO and 
Ambrose and Capone (1996, 1998) report that 32% to 38% of 
defaulted FHA loans transition to foreclosure. Therefore, the transition 
rates observed in this paper are similar to the high end of the 
conventional estimates and a little lower than the prior subprime 
estimate. 
Loans in the foreclosure process can have other outcomes 
beyond REO. For example, the data shows that of the exited loans, on 
top of the 50% that became REO property, approximately 16% fully or 
partially cured, and the remaining 34% were paid off. 
The paid off loans could cover all or only part of total obligation 
outstanding; however, in these cases the lender has fully terminated 
the loan and has taken the loss on any short (sale price < outstanding 
balance) sales or short prepayments. Since losses associated with 
owning property (REO) are reported to be over 50% of the outstanding 
debt obligation (Capozza and Thomson 2005), lenders may have 
strong incentives for avoiding real estate ownership and may be willing 
to accept short sales and prepayments as lower-cost substitutes. In 
fact, there is strong evidence that defaulted property depreciation is 
idiosyncratic and only partially driven by market-wide appreciation 
rates (Capozza and Thomson 2005; Pennington-Cross 2006). 
The data, leased from LoanPerformance, are loans from their 
Asset Backed Securities data base. These are loans that are securitized 
in the private label market that have been identified and marketed in 
the secondary market as subprime loans. Fixed-rate 15- and 30-year 
owner-occupied for-purchase and refinance loans are included in the 
sample to help remove as much unobserved heterogeneity as possible 
from the sample and isolate the impact of contemporaneous economic 
conditions, legal conditions, and prior loan performance. The average 
loan size at origination is just over $112,000 with a 15% down 
payment. The average Fair Isaac Corporation (FICO; consumer credit 
score) score was 604 and the average interest rate was over 9.3% and 
was approximately three percentage points above the prevailing 30-
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year (6.5%) and 15-year (6.0%) interest rates. Therefore, these loans 
are being charged a substantial premium by the mortgage market and 
the borrowers would likely have a difficult time securing prime rate 
credit because of relatively low credit scores. However, there are a few 
loans that have high credit scores included in the data set. These are 
likely still “subprime” for other reasons such as low or no 
documentation or other information was not included in the data set 
about the property or borrower. Often these loans are labeled 
“nonprime” or Alt-A loans. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics and descriptions of the 
estimation data set. Each of the 5,000 loans is repeatedly observed in 
each month from the beginning of foreclosure until right censoring, 
termination through lender property ownership, or termination through 
the loan being paid off. Therefore, the average fraction of loans in 
each type of exit will be much lower than the cumulative numbers. For 
example, while 50% of observed loans exited foreclosure by 
terminating the loan, the average monthly rate of loan terminations 
through REO is 4% and the average monthly rate of loan terminations 
by being paid off is 3%.  
Various factors could impact whether a loan cures or terminates. 
For example, consider the time or months spent in foreclosure 
(months). As a loan spends more time in foreclosure the lender is 
incurring many costs including legal expenses and missed interest 
payments. In addition, the borrower has little incentive to maintain 
their property because they likely will no longer own the home. 
Consistent with this scenario Harding et al. (2000) find evidence that 
borrowers with loan to value (ltv) ratios of 100% spend less on 
maintenance than other homeowners. In addition, it takes time to 
process foreclosures. Therefore we should expect few exits early in the 
process and a higher probability of terminating the loan as the variable 
months increases. 
The amount of equity is also likely to affect whether and in what 
manner the loan moves out of foreclosure. To measure equity the 
current loan-to-value ratio (cltv) is calculated using the unpaid balance 
of the loan in each month and the update house price using the Office 
of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight metropolitan area repeat sales 
price index. In general, the more equity in the home the less costly it 
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should be for the lender if the loan does become REO. However, the 
borrower may also have the opportunity to sell the house and pay off 
the loan in order to avoid being evicted. Since the borrower has the 
ability to move first by selling, this may be the primary type of 
termination when there is equity in the home. However, this will 
largely be an empirical question. Figure 1 provides the distribution of 
the estimated cltv at the beginning of the foreclosure process. It 
shows the expected peak of the distribution in the 75% to 80% cltvs. 
However, there is a lot of variation in homeowner equity. Table 2 plots 
the fraction of loans that are in each outcome type for a variety of cltv 
buckets at the last date of observation. It shows that large amounts of 
equity are usually associated with higher partial cure rates, full cure 
rates and paid off rates, while low and negative equity is associated 
with high rates of reo exit form foreclosure.  
Other measures of economic and borrower conditions may 
impact foreclosures as well. For example, the prior behavior of the 
borrower may provide an indication about borrower behavior during 
foreclosure as well as how the lender may treat the foreclosure 
process. To measure prior behavior the Fair Isaacs fico score at 
origination of the loan and the fraction of loan months that the loan 
was delinquent (in-default) prior to the initiation of foreclosure 
proceedings (delinq) are included. Prior extensive delinquency (delinq) 
likely indicates that the lender or servicer has provided considerable 
forbearance in the past. If this pattern continues, then these loans 
may spend more time in foreclosure and be less likely to terminate 
through REO or being paid off. Because these loans are in foreclosure, 
borrowers with better credit scores are damaging their credit history 
during the foreclosure process. As a result, credit will be even more 
costly in the future and the household will likely lose their home. While 
this story is compelling it is an empirical question whether these 
circumstances lead to prolonged stays in foreclosure or toward any of 
the particular method of loan termination or curing. Table 2 provides 
some initial evidence supporting this theory using the raw data. For 
example, loans that have been delinquent for prolonged periods prior 
to the beginning of foreclosure and have low credit scores are more 
likely to partially cure, while those loans with much more brief periods 
of delinquency with higher credit scores are more likely to fully cure. 
Figures 2 and 3 also provide the distribution of credit scores and 
homeowner equity. FICO scorers look to be normally distributed 
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around a peak in the 600 to 650 range. Delinquency (delinq) has a 
fatter right tail indicating that a significant proportion of loans linger 
for a long in the delinquent state before entering foreclosure.  
Conditions in the housing and labor markets could also impact 
the outcome of a foreclosure. To proxy for labor market conditions, the 
state-level contemporaneous unemployment rate is included (unemp). 
In general, it may be more difficult for households to cure outstanding 
debts when labor market conditions are poor. Therefore, locations with 
higher unemployment rates are expected to be associated with lower 
probabilities of curing or partial curing. The extent that it is “in the 
money” to refinance is also included to proxy for interest impacts 
(refi). The present discounted value of the current mortgage is 
compared with the present discounted value of a market rate 
mortgage assuming that the term of the loan is not adjusted.4 The 
savings are reported as a fraction, so that 0.10 indicates that there is 
a 10% savings by refinancing before considering transaction costs. If 
interest rates have dropped, making it substantially “in the money” to 
refinance, the opportunity cost (rates on loans that could be made in 
the current month) of staying in foreclosure has become relatively 
lower from the lenders’ perspective. In addition, if there is a fixed cost 
associated with some types of termination, loan size may also impact 
termination type. 
Prior research has found that state foreclosure laws can affect 
the volume and pricing of mortgage lending (Pence 2003; Ambrose 
and Sanders 2005). The legal conditions under which the foreclosure 
proceeds are also likely to have strong impacts on the length or 
duration of the foreclosure spell. For example, states that require that 
foreclosures be processed through the court system (jud) are likely to 
extend the stay in foreclosure and retard any exit or termination. 
States that provide the statutory right of redemption (srr) are also 
likely to be associated with longer stays in foreclosure, because 
lenders typically wait until the end of the redemption period (which 
starts after the foreclosure auction) before attempting to take the 
property. 
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Competing-risk Mixed Multinomial Logit Model 
While this paper differs from the prior literature because it 
focuses on what happens to loans that are in the foreclosure process 
as opposed to loans that are 90 days delinquent, the empirical 
techniques used are very similar because there are multiple potential 
outcomes that need to be considered. The prior literature has largely 
used the multinomial logit model specification. This approach is 
extended by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity and the correlation 
of the associated unobserved heterogeneities. In the logit context 
these types of models are typically referred to as mixed logit models, 
or in our case, because of the multiple potential outcomes, mixed 
multinomial logit. 
Logit models, both binomial and multinomial, have been widely 
used in reduced-form empirical models of mortgage termination. For 
instance, just in the study of 90-day-delinquent loans, recent 
examples include Ambrose and Capone (1998), Phillips and Vanderhoff 
(2004), Capozza and Thomson (2005, 2006), Phillips and Rosenblatt 
(1997). In each month the loan can be in only one state or outcome 
(delinquent, REO, prepaid, etc), so that by definition the multinomial 
logit model is a competing risks model.5  
Assume that there are J, j = 0,...,J-1, outcomes available and 
the vector of variables that explain the decision made for loan i is x i . 
The probability (π) of observing a particular loan outcome is given by  
 
 
The parameters, β 0, are normalized to zero for identification 
purposes. The other β parameters are chosen to maximize the log-
likelihood function  
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where d ij is a dummy variable equal to 1 if j is the outcome on loan i. 
 
A drawback to the multinomial logit model is an undesirable 
property known as Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA). 
For any two alternatives m and n, the ratio of the logit probabilities 
can be expressed as 
 
This odds ratio for alternatives m and n do not depend upon any 
other alternatives.6 An alternative modeling strategy that partly solves 
this problem is to use nested logit models. Loan outcomes are 
partitioned into a tree structure. Each upper-level group is called a 
“branch,” while each lower-level group of outcomes within a branch is 
called a “nest”. The IIA property holds within nests but not between 
nests. 
 
Similar to Clapp et al. (2006) the approach used in this paper is 
to take advantage of the unobserved heterogeneity and allow these 
heterogeneities to correlate. It is not possible to obtain loan-specific 
parameters to measure the impact of unobserved or random forces 
impacting the outcome. However, it is possible to capture the 
differences across loans by assuming that the heterogeneity follows 
some distribution (McFadden 1978; Wen and Koppelman 2001; Train 
2003). The assumed distribution (common assumptions include 
normal, lognormal, triangular, and uniform) is estimated with the use 
of an additional parameter or parameters. However, if the a priori 
assumption about the shape of the distribution differs from the actual 
and unobserved underlying distribution, inferior solutions can be found 
(Heckman and Singer 1984). The approach used in this paper is to not 
assume a specific distribution and instead create groups of loans that 
have higher or lower likelihoods of terminating the loan or becoming 
cured. The technique cannot directly observe which group or mass 
point each loan belongs to and instead estimates a discrete probability 
distribution so that each group has a unique influence on the 
conditional monthly probability estimate. Each group of loans is 
identified by a mass point, representing a distinct mass of loans. The 
technique is estimated using maximum likelihood to obtain estimates 
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of the size of each mass point and the idiosyncratic shift in the 
probability estimates.7 When conditioning on observed and unobserved 
heterogeneities, the outcomes are assumed to be independent of each 
other. However, when conditioned only on observed heterogeneity 
each of the risks can become interdependent. This interdependence is 
created through the correlation of unobserved heterogeneities 
associated with each risk. The following defines the likelihood function 
including the unobserved heterogeneity.  
 
υ jm are the location parameters that reflect the idiosyncratic risk 
for risk j for the mth unobserved heterogeneous group; p m is the 
mass-point parameter representing the proportion of loans in the mth 
group; again, the parameters, β 0, are normalized to zero for 
identification purposes and the other β parameters are chosen to 
maximize the log-likelihood function along with υ jm and p m . Following 
Dong and Koppelman (2003) and Yu (2006) to ensure that the 
proportions lie within [0, 1] and sum to 1, a logistic transformation is 
used on mass-point estimates.  
where −∞<qm<∞ and q 1 is normalized to 0. 
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Working from the bottom up, the equations define the likelihood 
function. Equation 6 (πijm) defines the probability of outcome j for loan 
i given an unobserved group of m. Equation 5 (Πij) defines the 
probability of outcome j for loan i by summing π ijm across all the 
groups while weighting each group by p. Equation 4 (lnL) defines the 
log of the likelihood by adding across all loans the log of the likelihood 
multiplied by outcome indictors (ΣΣd ij Π ij ) so that only actual 
outcome contributes to the likelihood (ΣΣd ij Π ij ). 
Results 
Table 3 provides the multinomial logit results with and without 
mixing. In general, both sets of reported results are similar in that 
coefficients for the exogenous variables are of similar size and 
direction. However, for some variables coefficient estimates can differ. 
For example, the impact of the local unemployment rate is lower on 
the results that do not include unobserved heterogeneity controls. 
Additionally, the coefficient is insignificant for curing without mixing 
but is significant and larger when mixing is allowed. There are also just 
as many instances when coefficient estimates become smaller in 
magnitude or become insignificant in the mixing specification. Prior 
duration analysis on other topics has also found that parameter 
estimates may be biased when unobserved heterogeneity is not 
controlled for (Deng et al. 2000).  
The mixing parameter estimates are provided at the bottom of 
Table 3.8 The mass-point estimate of 1.8245 undergoes a logistic 
transformation and indicates that approximately 86% of the loans are 
in group 1 and 14% are in group 2. Group 1 includes loans with a 
relatively low probability of curing and a high probability of partial 
curing or being paid off. The estimates can be viewed as shifts up or 
down to the baseline function (to be discussed below). Using location 
parameters paid off outcome, if there is only one group, the location 
parameter is −2.84; but when two groups of loans are allowed through 
the mixing function, the parameters are 0.59 and −5.06 for groups 1 
and 2, respectively. This indicates a large increase (decrease) in the 
probability of group 1 (group 2) terminating by being paid off. For the 
risk of terminating foreclosure through REO, there was no evidence of 
heterogeneity (REO2 was insignificant at the 10% level). Therefore, the 
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reported parameters include only one type of REO loan termination. 
This is why the parameter estimates for the REO risk type are very 
stable for the model specifications, both with and without mixing. 
Baseline 
The impact of the time the loan spends in foreclosure can be 
thought of as the baseline probability of leaving or exiting foreclosure 
and is measured by the variable months. Since the prior literature 
does not provide any guidance on the anticipated baseline, the results 
may be especially illuminating.9 The variable months is positive and 
significant for all risks, indicating that the conditional monthly 
probability of leaving foreclosure increases relative to staying in 
foreclosure in each month for each potential risk. However, the 
positive coefficients do not indicate that the probability is increasing in 
each month (more details below) for all potential outcomes. All figures 
include the estimated probability (cumulative or conditional) holding all 
other variables at their means. For example, Fig. 4 provides a plot of 
the cumulative probability of a loan exiting foreclosure through REO or 
being paid off as the loan spends additional time, measured in months, 
in foreclosure holding all other variables at their means. The 
cumulative probability increases at a decreasing rate for both types of 
termination (REO and paid off). After 2.5 to 3 years, almost no 
additional loans exit through REO, while a few more exit by being paid 
off. This nonlinear baseline is further shown in Fig. 5, where the 
conditional (conditioned on being alive at the beginning of the month) 
monthly probability baseline reveals the relatively high (low) 
probability for REO exits when the loan has been in foreclosure for a 
short (long) time period. By the end of 3 years, over 80% of the loans 
have exited foreclosure through REO or have been paid off. The 
expected time spent in foreclosure for the typical subprime loan is 
approximately 11 months. The remainder of the loans are cured 
(partially or completely).10 Therefore, while the probability of a loan 
curing may be important from a competing framework perspective, 
almost all loans that enter foreclosure exit through REO or are paid off. 
As a result, the remaining discussion will focus on these two outcomes.  
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Explanatory Variables 
Figures 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 plot the estimated conditional 
monthly probability of a loan exiting for each explanatory variable over 
the full range of observed values while holding all other variables 
constant. For example, consistent with Capozza and Thomson (2006) 
and Phillips and Vanderhoff (2004) Fig. 6 indicates that the probability 
of a loan exiting through REO is low (less than 1%) when there is a lot 
of equity in the home and much higher when there is negative equity 
in the home (over 8%). However, inconsistent with the prior literature, 
loans are more likely to exit foreclosure by being paid off when there is 
a lot of equity (up to 6%) and less likely to terminate by being paid off 
when there is low or negative equity (less than 2%). These results 
indicate that, although lenders would prefer to own property with 
positive equity, lenders are in practice most likely to own property 
when there is little or no equity and loss rates will be at their highest.  
The results (Fig. 7 and Table 3) indicate that borrowers who had 
higher credit scores at origination are more likely to exit through REO 
or through being paid off and as a result are less likely to cure. 
Therefore, their duration in foreclosure is shorter. This is in contrast to 
Capozza and Thomson (2006) who found that the outcome for 
subprime loans in default was not strongly affected by borrower credit 
scores. While there may be many potential explanations, this result 
may indicate that borrowers with poor scores have different reasons 
for being seriously delinquent than those with better scores. 
Higher area unemployment rates (Fig. 8) are associated with 
lower probabilities of exiting foreclosure through REO, thus leading to 
a longer stay in foreclosure. These results are consistent with the 
impact of local economic conditions on defaulted loan transitions into 
REO in both the subprime (Capozza and Thomson 2006) and 
conventional (Phillips and Vanderhoff 2004) mortgage markets. One 
interpretation of these results is that if a household does experience a 
reduction or stop in earnings, lenders may be patient in the hopes that 
the borrower will find gainful employment and start repaying the loan 
in the future. Therefore, the lender exercises more forbearance and 
the loan lingers in foreclosure. In fact, the probability of exiting 
foreclosure through REO of pay off decreases from just over 8% to 
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approximately 5% for unemployment rates ranging from 1.5% to 
10%. 
The delinquency of a loan before it enters foreclosure may also 
provide information on how the lender/servicer will proceed with 
foreclosures. The prior literature does not find any consistent results 
regarding indicators of prior payments and current performance once 
in default. This is likely due to the many different ways researchers 
have tried to measure past behavior of the loan. This paper’s results 
indicate that loans that have been delinquent over longer periods prior 
to foreclosure are more likely to exit foreclosure through REO than 
through paying off the loan (Fig. 9). In fact, loans that were not 
delinquent for very long are approximately four times more likely to 
exit foreclosure through paying off the mortgage, while loans that 
have been delinquent almost their whole lives are almost four times 
more likely to exit foreclosure through REO. In addition, the probability 
of the loan being cured is very sensitive to the history of delinquency. 
For example, loans with short delinquency spells are very likely to 
become cured (probability of being in the cured state is over 50% per 
month), while loans that have been delinquent for long spells have an 
almost negligible probability of being cured (under 1%). All of these 
results are consistent with the concept that lenders prefer not to be 
owners of property. As a result, property that ends up as REO come 
from loans where the borrower is in a state of distress (proxied by 
unemployment rates) or has pilling up large, unpaid bills and fees 
(proxied by time spent in serious delinquency). 
Consistent with Capozza and Thomson (2006), in terms of 
interest rates, the results indicate that when interest rates have 
dropped, the probability of the loan being paid off decreases, while the 
probability of the loan becoming REO is unaffected (Fig. 10). In 
addition, loans are more likely to be cured in “down” interest rate 
environments. While the reasons for these findings may be unclear, 
the results may reflect small modifications or other methods of lender 
forbearance. Larger loans, as measured by the outstanding balance, 
are less likely to exit foreclosure through being paid off while smaller 
loans are more likely to exit foreclosure through REO (Fig. 11). 
The impact of foreclosure laws on duration of foreclosure spells 
can be quite dramatic. For example, a loan in a power-of-sale state 
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has a 53% higher probability of exiting foreclosure through REO than 
the average identical loan in a judicial foreclosure state. In addition, 
the probability of exiting foreclosure through paying off is also 28% 
higher. Phillips and VanderHoff (2004) also simulate a 50% increase in 
the probability of foreclosure for power-of-sale proceedings and 
strongly suggest the need for regulatory reform to speed the 
foreclosure process. The findings in this paper echo prior finding and 
further indicate that power-of-sale proceedings not only increase the 
probability of exiting foreclosure through REO or paying off the loan, 
but also boost the probability of a loan in foreclosure to curing or 
partially curing. In contrast, states that allow a statutory right of 
redemption had almost no observable impact on the duration of 
foreclosure spells. 
An alternative way to augment the baseline to reflect the speed 
of foreclosure is to directly include an estimate of the foreclosure 
speed for the state. A specification test was conducted using the 
average or typical number of months the initial foreclosure process 
takes (Clauretie and Sirmans 2006, p. 287) as an additional 
explanatory variable. However, since the average time for the initial 
process is largely determined by state foreclosure laws, the variables 
jud and srr cannot be included in the specification. The “months to 
complete initial action” variable performed as expected and had little 
impact on other variables’ coefficient estimates. For example, states 
with longer foreclosure proceedings all have lower probabilities of 
exiting foreclosure through any method (curing, partial curing, REO, of 
pay off).11  
Conclusion 
This research examines a unique data set of subprime loans that 
are in foreclosure. The data allows the monthly observation of the loan 
until the loan terminates. Loans can exit foreclosure through curing, 
partially (delinquent) curing, becoming REO property, or paying off the 
outstanding balance on the loan (paid off). For loans that are in 
foreclosure for a relatively short time period (less than a year) the 
primary way to exit foreclosure is through REO; but, as the time in 
foreclosure lengthens, paying off the loan becomes the dominate way 
to exit. 
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Consistent with the findings of Ambrose and Capone (1998), the 
results of this paper indicate that loans in foreclosure include 
borrowers who are exercising the put option and those who may be 
using extended periods of nonpayment to finance other expenditures 
or receive temporary free rent. In the data, approximately 40% of the 
loans were terminated through REO whereas 27% were terminated 
through paying off the loan. In contrast, 13% of the loans were 
successfully cured or partially cured. 
The composite conditions that lead to the lender becoming the 
owner of the underlying property are—early exit of foreclosure, low or 
no equity left in the property either due to a low initial down payment 
or declining property values, a relatively high borrower credit score for 
subprime, a long history of delinquency before foreclosure begins, 
declining interest rates, a smaller loan amount or loan balance, and 
the property being located in a state with power-of-sale foreclosures. 
In conjunction with prior literature, the behavior of troubled 
loans in the subprime market is also becoming clearer. Subprime loans 
tend to linger for long periods when the loan is behind in its payments, 
but once the foreclosure process has begun, subprime loans proceed 
on a more typical pace. For example, Capozza and Thomson (2006) 
estimate that it can take 6.5 years for a seriously delinquent subprime 
loan to transition to foreclosure. In contrast, for seriously delinquent 
FHA loans, Ambrose and Capone (1996) find an average duration of 
only 7.5 months. The results found here indicate that the expected 
time spent in foreclosure for the typical subprime loan is 
approximately 11 months. 
Subprime loans are also more likely to exit foreclosure with the 
lender becoming the owner of the underlying property. Consistent with 
the perception that foreclosures are the least preferred and most 
expensive method of resolving a problem loan, both seriously 
delinquent (Capozza and Thomson 2006) and loans in foreclosure are 
more likely to be paid off if there is more equity in the home 
foreclosure. In addition, while some loans may cure even after 
foreclosure proceedings have started, the vast majority will eventually 
terminate the loans through REO or paying off the loan. 
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While prior evidence indicated that subprime loans tend to linger 
for long periods in serious delinquency, the results in this paper 
indicate that this pattern of behavior is not without a cost. In 
particular, loans that have experienced substantial forbearance in the 
past are more likely to become REO property if they enter foreclosure. 
The results of this paper also indicate the need for reform of the 
legal process used to adjudicate foreclosure proceedings in many 
states. In particular, relative to states that require a judicial 
foreclosure, power-of-sale states are associated with large increases in 
the conditional monthly probability of curing (30% to 65% higher) and 
terminating through REO or paying off the loan (28% to 45% higher). 
Therefore, foreclosures in power-of-sale states take much less time to 
complete, but can also increase the likelihood of the loan curing. In 
total, in power-of sale states a loan in foreclosure is more likely to 
have a superior outcome for both the lender and the borrower. 
Endnotes 
1 The reason lenders wait until after 90-days delinquency to start 
foreclosure proceedings is a hold-over from English common law 
called “equity of redemption.” The intent is to delay the taking 
of the property or the initiation of that process because the 
taking of someone’s home is an action with substantial and 
serious consequences. 
  
2 Note that typically the lender “buys” the property and it becomes 
owned by the lender or “real estate owned”. Then the lender 
sells the property in an attempt to recoup as much of the losses 
as possible. 
  
3 Another tool that could be used to reduce debt servicing 
requirements is to refinance into a loan with a longer repayment 
period or an adjustable rate loan. 
  
4 The Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey (PMMS) is used to 
proxy for prevailing interest rates on mortgages. Since these are 
subprime loans with risk premiums, the risk premium of the 
loan at origination is used to adjust up the PMMS rate to create 
a comparable market rate. 
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5 A risk in this context reflects the types of outcome (termination or 
cure) in each month that compete to be observed. 
  
6 A well-known example illustrates a problem with this assumption. A 
traveler has a choice of going to work by car or by a blue bus. 
Let the choice probabilities be equal, implying the ratio of 
probabilities equals 1. Now introduce a choice of a red bus that 
the traveler considers equivalent to a blue bus. We would expect 
the probability of going to work by car to remain the same at 
0.5, while the probabilities of going to work by bus would be 
split evenly between blue and red buses at 0.25. If this were 
true, then the ratio of probabilities between car and blue bus, 
formerly at 1, would now be equal to 2 (0.5 divided by 0.25). 
The multinomial logit model does not allow this possibility. 
Recall that there are equal probabilities of taking a blue bus and 
a red bus. The only profile of probabilities that fit these two 
constraints puts equal probability of 0.33 on each choice. The 
multinomial logit would therefore overestimate the probability of 
taking a blue or a red bus and would underestimate the 
probability of taking a car. 
  
7 The likelihood function is maximized in SAS using Proc NLP, and the 
code is available on request from the author. 
  
8 During estimation at most two mass points could be identified. 
Attempts to estimate with three mass-points could not converge 
or drove the size of one group to almost zero. 
  
9 Phillips and VanderHoff (2004) do include a variable called default-
time, but they only analyze the last observed outcome in their 
sample. Therefore, it is difficult to create or interpret a baseline 
estimate. 
  
10 The conditional monthly probability of curing or partially curing is 
over 89% in the 37th month. 
  
11 Replacing jud and srr with “months to complete initial action” the 
coefficient estimates for each outcome are cure (−0.144439), 
partial cure (−0.535416), REO (−0.251730), paid off 
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(−0.421515). The mean “months to complete initial action” is 
4.84 months ranging from 1 to 9 months. 
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Appendix  
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Description 
Foreclose 0.62 0.48 0 1 Loan in foreclosure proceedings 
Cure 0.15 0.36 0 1 Loan current 
Partial cure 0.16 0.37 0 1 Loan delinquent 
REO 0.04 0.19 0 1 Property is real estate owned by the lender 
Paid offa  0.03 0.16 0 1 Loan paid off 
Months 10.07 8.79 1 52 Months in foreclosure 
Cltv 72.15 13.91 10.19 108.96 
Current loan to value ratio calculated using 
actual balance and the updated house price 
using state level OFHEO HPI 
Fico 603.84 58.67 417 818 Fair Isaac credit score at loan origination 
Unemp 5.41 1.37 2.1 26.2 
State unemployment rate in the current 
month collected from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Delinq 0.49 0.24 0.02 1 
Share of months loan was delinquent prior 
to when the foreclosure was initiated 
Refi 0.08 0.07 –0.19 0.89 
Fraction “in the money” to refinance due to 
market wide interest rate changes 
Upb 10.67 9.03 1.20 145.58 
Outstanding or unpaid balance ($10,000′s) 
on the loan in each month 
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Variable Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Description 
Jud 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Judicial foreclosure state = 1, and power-of-
sale state = 0 (Pence 2003) 
Srr 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Statutory right of redemption state = 1, and 
non-redemption state = 0 (Pence 2003) 
Loans 5,000       Number of loans 
Observations 53,924       Number of loan-months 
aLoans can be paid off for a variety of reasons including, selling the home, third-party 
sales at the foreclosure auction, refinancing into a new loan, etc. 
Table 2. Outcome by variable and category 
Variable/category 
Outcome Type 
Cure (%) Partial cure (%) REO (%) Paid off (%) 
FICO 
 FICO ≤ 500 4 20 36 27 
 500 < FICO ≤ 550 9 11 38 27 
 550 < FICO ≤ 600 7 9 38 27 
 600 < FICO ≤ 650 7 5 43 26 
 650 < FICO ≤ 700 5 4 43 30 
 700 < FICO ≤ 750 2 2 45 36 
 750 < FICO 5 1 39 39 
LTV t  = T  
 LTV t  = T  ≤ 40 28 10 6 42 
 40 < LTV t  = T  ≤ 50 20 14 6 34 
 50 < LTV t  = T  ≤ 60 10 12 16 38 
 60 < LTV t  = T  ≤ 70 9 10 30 31 
 80 < LTV t  = T  ≤ 90 3 5 50 24 
 90 < LTV t  = T  ≤ 100 4 3 55 22 
 LTV t  = T  > 100 1 1 59 26 
Delinquency history 
 DELINQ ≤ 10 31 1 3 43 
 10 < DELINQ ≤ 20 17 4 21 37 
 20 < DELINQ ≤ 30 11 5 35 31 
 30 < DELINQ ≤ 40 6 5 41 32 
 40 < DELINQ ≤ 50 6 5 48 26 
 50 < DELINQ ≤ 60 4 7 48 23 
 60 < DELINQ ≤ 70 3 6 48 24 
 70 < DELINQ ≤ 80 1 10 46 24 
 DELINQ > 80 1 17 43 20 
The numbers indicate the percent of loans on their last observed date are in each 
outcome. These results are not model generated and reflect the “raw” data from the 
sample. FICO is the Fair Isaac’s consumer credit score at origination of the loan. LTV t 
 = T is the estimated loan to value ratio on the last date observed. Delinq is the fraction 
of the loan’s life spent in delinquency prior to the beginning of foreclosure proceedings 
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Table 3. Multinomial logit results 
Risk Variable 
Without mixing With mixing 
Coeff. Std Err Coeff. Std Err 
Cure 
Months 0.1508a  0.0022 0.1651a  0.0026 
Ltvc −0.0179a  0.0011 −0.0182a  0.0012 
FICO −0.0038a  0.0003 −0.0038a  0.0003 
Unemp 0.0148 0.0101 0.0265a  0.0107 
Delinq −7.6200a  0.0975 −8.3110a  0.1167 
Refi −0.9498a  0.2206 −1.1439a  0.2306 
Upb 0.0057a  0.0018 0.0064a  0.0018 
Jud −0.7043a  0.0318 −0.6488a  0.0340 
Srr −0.0331 0.0476 −0.0232 0.0500 
Partial cure 
Months 0.0829a  0.0018 0.0906a  0.0029 
Ltvc −0.0059a  0.0010 −0.0076a  0.0014 
FICO −0.0056a  0.0003 −0.0066a  0.0004 
Unemp −0.0341a  0.0097 −0.0522a  0.0126 
Delinq 0.0382 0.0690 0.6333a  0.1182 
Refi 0.1380 0.1948 0.1709 0.2522 
Upb −0.0020 0.0015 −0.0013 0.0021 
Jud −1.4575a  0.0288 −1.9194a  0.0858 
Srr 0.0975a  0.0379 0.1205a  0.0491 
REO 
Months 0.0203a  0.0039 0.0208a  0.0039 
Ltvc 0.0246a  0.0021 0.0249a  0.0021 
FICO 0.0008b  0.0004 0.0008b  0.0004 
Unemp −0.0687a  0.0192 −0.0683a  0.0192 
Delinq −0.1527 0.1210 −0.1414 0.1226 
Refi −0.0266 0.3524 −0.0289 0.3522 
Upb −0.0153a  0.0032 −0.0155a  0.0032 
Jud −1.0888a  0.0503 −1.0963a  0.0505 
Srr 0.0045 0.0661 0.0034 0.0662 
Paid off 
Months 0.0706a  0.0041 0.0735a  0.0056 
Ltvc −0.0201a  0.0020 −0.0234a  0.0030 
FICO 0.0017a  0.0005 −0.0004 0.0008 
Unemp −0.0575a  0.0211 −0.0945a  0.0264 
Delinq −2.6305a  0.1564 −1.1865a  0.2391 
Refi −2.2496a  0.4091 −2.3367a  0.5354 
Upb 0.0139a  0.0023 0.0180a  0.0052 
Jud −0.7143a  0.0597 −1.6382a  0.1727 
Srr 0.0401 0.0837 0.1018 0.1125 
Mass point Mass1      1.8245a  0.0991 
Location 
Cure1  −1.7399a  0.0279 −4.2005a  0.4950 
Cure2      −1.7844a  0.0301 
Partial cure1  −0.7441a  0.0200 1.8730a  0.2046 
Partial cure2      −1.2842a  0.0773 
REO1  −2.3051a  0.0365 −2.3012a  0.0366 
Paid off1  −2.8371a  0.0458 0.5867b  0.2865 
Paid off2      −5.0635a  1.1941 
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All continuous variables are mean deleted for estimation. The second group for the 
REO location parameter was insignificant and therefore not included in the final 
specification. A logistic transformation is used for the reported mass point coefficients 
aSignificant at 1% 
bSignificant at 10% 
Figure 1. Distribution of LTV. LTV is the estimated loan to value ratio at 
beginning of foreclosure proceedings 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of FICO score. FICO is the Fair Isaac’s consumer credit 
score at origination of the loan 
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Figure 3. Distribution of history of delinquency. Delinq is the fraction of the 
loan’s life spent in delinquency prior to the beginning of foreclosure 
proceedings 
 
 
  
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Vol. 40, No. 2 (February 2010): pg. 109-129. DOI. This article is © Springer 
and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Springer does not grant 
permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from 
Springer. 
27 
 
Figure 4. Cumulative baseline. All other variables are evaluated at their 
means 
 
 
Figure 5. Conditional monthly baseline. All other variables are evaluated at 
their means 
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Figure 6. Probability of exit and the current loan to value ratio. All other 
variables are evaluated at their means 
 
 
Figure 7. Probability of exit and the credit score at origination. All other 
variables are evaluated at their means 
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Figure 8. Probability of exit and unemployment rates. All other variables are 
evaluated at their means 
 
 
Figure 9. Probability of exit and prior delinquency. All other variables are 
evaluated at their means 
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Figure 10. Probability of exit and interest rates. All other variables are 
evaluated at their means 
 
 
Figure 11. Probability of exit and outstanding balance. All other variables are 
evaluated at their means 
 
 
